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Abstract— An NEIO approach is used to measure seller 
market  power  in  the  French  Comté  cheese  market, 
characterised by government-approved  supply control. 
The  estimation  is  performed  on  quarterly  data  at  the 
wholesale  stage  over  the  period  1985-2005.  Three 
different elasticity shifters are included in the demand 
specification, and the supply equation accounts for the 
existence  of  the  European  dairy  quota  policy.  The 
market  power  estimate  is  small  and  statistically 
insignificant.  Monopoly  is  rejected,  as  well  as  weak 
forms of Cournot oligopoly. Results appear to be robust 
to the choice of functional form, and suggest little effect 
of the supply control scheme on consumer prices. 
 





Comté is one of the most popular cheeses in France, 
with an annual production of about 50,000 metric tons, 
making the Comté industry the largest cheese industry 
benefiting  from  a  protected  designation  of  origin 
(PDO)  in  the  country.  (Most  of  the  production  is 
consumed nationally.) Production has been increasing 
steadily  since  the  early  1990s.  The  industry  is 
characterised  by  the  existence  of  industry-wide 
contracts  between  upstream  producers  (dairy 
cooperatives)  and  downstream  processors  (ripening 
facilities),  as  well  as  government-approved  supply 
control.  
A  New  Empirical  Industrial  Organization  (NEIO) 
approach is used to assess the degree of seller market 
power  exercised  in  the  Comté  cheese  market.  The 
question has policy relevance given the importance of 
the industry and the controversial nature of the supply 
control scheme. In 1998, the producer association, the 
Comité  interprofessionnel  du  gruyère  de  Comté 
(CIGC), was fined by the French antitrust authority for 
implementing a production plan without government 
support. (The plan consisted of charging penalties to 
individual  producers  for  production  in  excess  of  a 
predetermined quota. A similar plan was approved by 
public  authorities  immediately  afterwards,  and  such 
production plans are still in place today.) The Court's 
1998 ruling stated: 
[...] it remains undisputed that, on the first hand, 
the  [supply  control]  measure  targeted  all  Comté-
producing  firms  and,  on  the  other  hand,  [...]  the 
criticized measure had a deterring effect which limited 
the price decrease and made  Comté production less 
attractive for Emmental producers wishing to shift to 
Comté production; [...] finally, that several firms were 
indeed  charged  with  a  penalty  for  producing  above 
their allocated quota, for a total amount of 1,156,509 
French Francs; that, as a result, the measure had a 
significant effect on the market in question [...]. 
In  a  2000  report,  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  expressed  concerns 
regarding  the  existence  of  market  power  associated 
with  certain  European  PDOs,  explicitly  referring  to  
specialty cheese markets [1]. In addition, approval of 
the  Comté  production  plan  by  public  authorities,  in 
particular  the  French  Ministry  of  Consumer  Affairs, 
has traditionally been difficult to obtain. 
Yet,  the  empirical  importance  of  the  existing 
distortion  remains  unknown.  An  empirical  analysis 
that  estimates  the  extent  of  market  power  being 
exercised in the Comté market is thus of interest to 
policymakers, and potentially to antitrust authorities. 
More  generally,  economists  have  been  prompt  in 
describing European PDOs as cartelised markets, and 
this argument may be used to oppose the recognition 
of PDOs at the international level. (For an overview of 
the debate over geographical indications between the 
EU  and  the  US,  see  for  instance  [2].)  Although 
focused on a particular commodity, this study sheds 
doubt  on  the  ability  of  collective  marketing 
arrangements such as those observed in certain PDO 
markets to sustain monopoly prices. 
Traditionally, the NEIO technique has been used to 
measure the effects of industry concentration on buyer 
or seller competition and the efficiency of markets. It 
has also been used, in agricultural applications, to test 
whether  marketing  institutions  such  as  producer 
cooperatives  or  marketing  orders  benefiting  from 
antitrust  exemptions  have  been  successful  in 
extracting  oligopoly  rents  [3,4].  The  present  paper 
belongs to this latter branch of literature.  
The  article  addresses  the  concern  that  the  NEIO 
methodology  has  often  been  implemented  on  overly 
aggregated industries [5]. By focusing on one cheese variety, without ignoring the possibility of substitution 
with  other  cheeses,  the  study  narrowly  defines  the 
imperfectly  competitive  industry  and  tailors  the 
estimation procedure to a close observation of policy, 
technology and demand conditions. The existence of a 
preexisting distortion due to the European dairy quota 
policy is taken into consideration by specifying cost as 
the  opportunity  cost  of  not  producing  a  substitute 
cheese.  This  constitutes  an  interesting  adaptation  of 
the standard NEIO model.  
The estimation leads to the conclusion that if market 
power has been exerted by the Comté industry, it is 
hard to detect econometrically and likely very small. 
This  finding  suggests  that  consumers  have  not  been 
hurt by supply control and that the social cost of the 
policy has been negligible.  
 
II. THE FRENCH COMTÉ CHEESE MARKET 
 
Comté is a pressed, cooked cheese made out of raw 
cow’s milk, aged for at least 4 months, that comes in 
large wheels weighing between 66 and 106 lbs. The 
specificity of Comté cheese was recognised by a Court 
decision in 1952, and its production was first codified 
in  1958.  Comté  was  introduced  in  the  European 
register of protected designations of origin in 1996, the 
date the register was created. Production is currently 
regulated by a 2007 governmental decree. The decree 
contains provisions such as the delimitation of the area 
of  production,  the  physical  characteristics  of  the 
cheese, and restrictions on the production methods to 
be used at each stage of fabrication, including the farm 
level.  Notable  production  constraints  include 
restrictions  on  cow  breeds,  on  feed,  limits  on  the 
stocking rate, and limits on the distance travelled for 
collecting milk. 
The production process unfolds in three stages: milk 
production,  cheese  fabrication  and  cheese  ripening. 
All  stages  must  take  place  within  a  delimited 
geographical  area  covering  several  districts  of  the 
Franche-Comté region. The geographical constraint is 
not  binding.  Between  60  and  70%  of  the  milk 
produced  in  the  eligible  region  is  transformed  into 
Comté cheese. In January of 2005, there were about 
3,300  milk  producers,  190  cheese  factories  and  20 
ripening  facilities  involved  in  Comté  cheese 
production. Notably, 85% of the cheese factories were 
owned by milk producers through cooperatives. 
Milk  producers,  dairy  cooperatives  and  ripening 
facilities  are  represented  by  a  producer  association, 
CIGC,  whose  stated  missions  are  to  guarantee  the 
specificity  of  Comté  cheese  and  help  producers 
maintain  a  sustainable  activity  in  the  region.  CIGC 
fulfills  its  first  mission  by  controlling  producers  at 
various  stages  of  the  production  process,  filing 
lawsuits  against  imitators,  and  participating  in  the 
development of standards.  
The  second  mission  is  fulfilled  through  technical 
assistance  to  producers,  generic  advertising  and  the 
promotion of Comté cheese in export markets. CIGC 
also  makes  a  yearly  production  plan  to  limit  the 
quantity of Comté cheese produced, paired with model 
contracts designed to redistribute wealth between milk 
producers and ripening facilities.  
The  production  plan  is  enforced  through  the 
delivery  of  certification  marks  necessary  to 
authenticate cheese wheels. Marks are purchased from 
CIGC  by  cheese  factories  and  applied  onto  unripe 
cheese wheels. Each factory is allocated a quota and 
charged a premium for each mark purchased beyond 
that quota. The penalty is adjusted to account for any 
modification  in  the  average  weight  of  wheels.  The 
production plan is subject to yearly approval by the 
government. 
The  main  purpose  of  the  model  contracts,  to  be 
adopted by ripening facilities and the cheese factories 
supplying them, is to set the price of unripe cheese. 
The  contract  also  compels  the  ripening  facility  to 
purchase all the cheese produced by its suppliers.  
Therefore,  the  Comté  production  sector  can  be 
modeled as a vertically integrated entity, with CIGC 
choosing  the  total  quantity  to  be  produced  and 
reallocating  rents  through  the  contractual  price  of 
unripe cheese. These rents include the quota rent from 
the  European  dairy  quota  program,  as  well  as  any 
additional rent generated by the supply control scheme 
at the expense of buyers of ripened cheese. In what 
follows,  we  refer  to  the  vertically  integrated  Comté 
production sector as “the Comté industry”. 
 
III. ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
While the NEIO approach need not be explained in 
detail here, some features of the methodology deserve 
attention.  (See  [6]  and  [7]  for  a  presentation  of  the 
NEIO technique.) 










  = c,                        (1) where 
￿ 
P C is the price of Comté cheese, 
￿ 
c the marginal 
cost, 
￿ 
 CC the own-price demand elasticity and 
￿ 
  is a 
market-level parameter that is simply interpreted as a 
degree  of  competitiveness,  as  suggested in  [5].  It  is 
equal to zero if the industry is competitive, and to 1 if 
the industry behaves as a monopolist. In a symmetric 
Cournot oligopoly with n firms, 
￿ 
  would take on the 
value 
￿ 
1 n. The parameter 
￿ 
 , later referred to as the 
market power or conduct parameter, is directly related 
to the Lernex index 
￿ 
L of imperfect competition for 
the industry:   = L  CC . Here, imperfect competition 
is assumed to originate in the production limitations 
imposed  on  individual  producers  by  CIGC.  Using 
time-series  data  on  price  and  quantity,  we  estimate 
equation  (1),  together  with  a  demand  equation,  in 
order to jointly determine the demand elasticity, the 
marginal  cost  and  the  conduct  parameter. 
Identification  of 
￿ 
   relies  on  temporal  variation  in 
￿ 
 CC, so we need to introduce demand shifters that also 
shift the demand elasticity. 
Three elasticity shifters are included in the demand 
specification:  the  price  of  a  substitute  cheese 
(Emmental cheese), income, and quarterly dummies. 
Emmental is the main type of pressed, cooked cheese 
manufactured in France, with an annual production of 
about 250,000 metric tons. By “elasticity shifters”, we 
mean variables that interact with the price of Comté 
cheese on the right-hand side of the demand equation 
(quantity being the dependent variable), and therefore 
allow the calculated demand elasticity to vary across 
the period. To the extent of our knowledge, this is the 
first  NEIO  study  to  incorporate  three  different 
elasticity shifters in the demand equation. Typically, 
shifters are included either as interaction terms  with 
price (“slope shifters”) or as additive terms (“intercept 
shifters”). This imposes unduly restrictions on demand 
and could lead to spurious effects of the slope shifters 
on the calculated elasticity. Therefore, in our demand 
equation,  each  shifter  is  introduced  both  as  a  slope 
shifter  and  an  intercept  shifter.  (See  [4]  for  a 
discussion on the choice of demand shifters in existing 
NEIO  studies.)  Following  the  NEIO  practice,  we 
conduct sensitivity analysis by testing two alternative 
functional form specifications for demand. 
Regarding the supply relationship, we do not rely 
on  factor  prices  to  specify  the  marginal  cost  curve, 
thereby  departing  from  the  standard  NEIO  model. 
Instead, we use the lagged price of a close substitute in 
production,  Emmental  cheese,  assumed  to  be  fixed 
exogenously, together with terms aimed at capturing 
the  production  cost  difference  between  Comté  and 
Emmental.  The  choice  of  the  lag  is  justified  by 
differences in the ripening time of the two varieties, 
Comté  cheese  being  ripened  for  a  longer  period.  In 
doing this, we explicitly recognise the fact that there 
exist alternative uses for the European milk quota in 
the region, mainly the production of Emmental cheese. 
The  share  of  Comté  and  Emmental  among  the  four 
main  cheeses  produced  in  Franche-Comté  (Comté, 
Emmental,  Morbier  and  Raclette)  was  96.5%  at  the 
beginning of the study period and decreased to 83.9% 
in 2005. Over the period, the mean was about 89.8%. 
(These  shares  are  rough  estimates  computed  by 
comparing the quantities of each cheese variety, and 
do not account for differences in their milk content. It 
is  expected  that  the  milk  content  of  Comté  and 
Emmental is higher than that of the other two cheeses, 
which are not cooked.) Notably, the vast majority of 
new entrants in the Comté industry over the period of 
investigation  have  originated  in  cheese  factories 
previously  specialised  in  Emmental  production. 
Introducing the lagged price of the main substitute in 
production in the cost specification amounts to using 
the opportunity cost of producing Comté cheese, that 
is,  the  difference  in  the  marginal  price-cost  margin 
between the two cheese varieties. 
Another  reason  for  including  the  lagged  price  of 
Emmental in the cost specification is that it includes 
any dairy quota rent accruing to the dairy production 
sector, and is therefore a better indication of the true 
cost of producing Comté than a sum of physical input 
costs.  In  fact,  ignoring  the  possibility  that  the  dairy 
quota  has  been  binding  over  the  period  of  interest 
could  lead  the  analyst  to  spuriously  attribute 
significant  price-cost  margins  to  the  presence  of 
market power at the level of the Comté industry, while 
they are in fact due to the dairy quota and exist as well 
in  other  dairy  markets.  (Evidence  suggests  that  the 
European dairy quota has been binding in the Comté 
region,  meaning  that  the  average  price  of  dairy 
products has exceeded the marginal cost of producing 
milk in this region.) By specifying marginal cost as the 
opportunity cost of not producing Emmental, we thus 
seek  to  detect  any  additional  markup  beyond  that 
originating  in  the  European  dairy  quota.  Section  IV 
develops a theoretical model of imperfect competition 
that  accommodates  the  preexisting  dairy  quota 
distortion and the existence of alternative milk uses, 
and  is  consistent  with  the  traditional  market-level 
NEIO equilibrium. The  contemporaneous  and  lagged  prices  of 
Emmental  cheese  are  used  as  instruments  in  the 
empirical estimation. The assumption that these prices 
are exogenous to the demand and the supply relation is 
justified by the fact that entry is free in the Emmental 
market.  Notably,  there  are  no  specific  restrictions 
regarding  the  quality  of  milk  used  for  Emmental 
production,  and  Emmental  cheese  can  be  produced 
anywhere.  (Today,  more  than  70%  of  the  total 
production of Emmental in France occurs outside of 
the  traditional  area  of  production.)  Therefore,  the 
Emmental  market  is  assumed  to  be  competitive.  In 
addition, if generic milk is transformed into Emmental 
cheese  according  to  a  fixed-proportion,  constant-
returns-to-scale  technology,  which  we  will  assume, 
then  the  exogeneity  of  the  Emmental  price  will  be 
satisfied as soon as random shocks to the demand for 
Comté  cheese  and  to  its  supply  relation  are 
uncorrelated  with  the  equilibrium  price  of  generic 
milk,  which  under  the  dairy  quota  system  is 
determined  by  the  available  quota  and  the  total 
demand for milk. These random shocks in the Comté 
market may potentially affect the equilibrium price of 
generic milk in two ways: by shifting the total supply 
of generic milk or the demand for dairy products other 
than Comté cheese. We argue that both effects should 
be  negligible,  given  that  the  milk  market  can  be 
considered European-wide. First, even though random 
shocks to the demand for Comté or its supply relation 
affect  the  quantity  of  milk  quotas  used  for  Comté 
production,  and  therefore  that  available  to  produce 
generic milk, this is unlikely to affect the total milk 
supply,  since  Comté  represents  less  than  5%  of  the 
total milk collected in France. Second, random shocks 
to  the  price  of  Comté  may  shift  the  demand  for 
substitutes  of  Comté,  but  again  this  is  unlikely  to 
affect the derived demand for milk, given the small 
share of the total European milk supply transformed 
into cheeses that can be considered close substitutes to 
Comté cheese.  
Finally, let us consider the choice of the frequency 
of data. Most of the variables needed, except income 
and population, are available at a monthly frequency. 
Since the production plan sets production caps for a 1-
year period, it seems to call for the use of yearly data. 
Besides considerably reducing the sample size, such 
an approach  would ignore specific provisions of the 
production plan, however. During the year, CIGC can 
adopt exceptional compulsory or voluntary measures, 
such as withdrawals of eligible milk or unripe cheese 
wheels,  whenever  the  market  situation  is  deemed 
unfavorable.  While  compulsory  withdrawals  have 
been  exceptional,  voluntary  (but  financially 
encouraged)  withdrawals  have  been  used  more 
frequently.  The  possibility  of  adjustments  to  the 
production plan during the year may therefore partly 
justify the use of less aggregated data.  
Another  consideration  that  should  come  to  play 
when  deciding  upon  data  frequency  is  the  observed 
differences  in  the  ripening  time  of  Comté  cheese. 
Aging  varies  from  4  to  24  or  even  30  months.  In 
addition,  cheese  wheels  can  be  stored  at  low 
temperatures to suspend the ripening process,  which 
further increases firms’ ability to delay the marketing 
of cheese. Therefore, one cannot completely rule out 
the endogeneity of the ripening time. Yet, by using a 
static  model  of  imperfect  competition  and  assuming 
that the industry is vertically integrated, we overlook 
the  strategic  decisions  of  ripening  facilities  with 
respect to ripening and storage. The error associated 
with using a static framework will be greater if we use 
high-frequency  data,  while  it  would  theoretically 
disappear if the frequency were low enough to assume 
that all cheese wheels are ripened within one period.   
Taking  all  these  considerations  into  account,  we 
choose  to  use  quarterly  data,  which  represents  the 
lowest  frequency  allowing  us  to  obtain  acceptable 
estimates. (Using yearly data would result in a sample 
size of only 21.) While this does not totally solve the 
issue of endogenous ripening, it should be less critical 
than with monthly data, especially since the bulk of 
the production is sold between 6 and 8 months of age, 
with a tendency towards longer ripening times at the 
end of the period of investigation.  
Estimation of the system of simultaneous equations 
is  done  using  the  iterated  non  linear  optimal 
generalized  method  of  moments  [8].  The  J-test  of 
overidentifying  restrictions  fails  to  reject  the  model 
specification  or  the  stochastic  assumptions  used  for 
identification,  giving  empirical  credence  to  the 
assumption  that  the  contemporaneous  and  lagged 
prices  of  Emmental  cheese  can  be  considered 
exogenous to the demand and supply of Comté. 
 
IV. THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
Assume  that  producers  in  the  Comté  region  can 
produce 2 goods, Comté cheese and Emmental cheese, 
according to the aggregate cost function 
￿ 
C QC,QE, 2 ( ), 
where 
￿ 
QC and  QE, 2  denote the quantities of Comté 
and Emmental produced. (This cost does not include the dairy quota rent.) The function 
￿ 
C is assumed to 
have all desirable properties, i.e., it is nondecreasing in 
its  arguments  and  convex.  Producers  are  endowed 
with 
￿ 
  milk quotas, and the dairy quota is binding. 
While  producers  located  in  the  Comté  region  have 
exclusivity over the production of Comté cheese, they 
only produce a small share of the total milk supply, 
and therefore we assume that they cannot influence the 
price  of  Emmental.  (Entry  is  free  in  the  Emmental 
market.) Let us call 
￿ 
kC  the coefficient of conversion 
of milk into Comté cheese, and 
￿ 
kE the coefficient of 
conversion  of  milk  into  Emmental  cheese,  both 
assumed to be fixed. That is, 1 unit of dairy quota can 
be used to produce 
￿ 
kC  units of Comté cheese or 
￿ 
kE 
units  of  Emmental  cheese.  The  inverse  demand 
function for Comté cheese is denoted 
￿ 
P . (), and 
￿ 
PE, 2 
denotes the price of Emmental, supposed to be fixed. 
(The twice-lagged variables 
￿ 
QE, 2 and 
￿ 
PE, 2 take into 
account  the  fact  that  Comté  cheese  is  ripened  for  a 
longer period than Emmental cheese. Over the period, 
Comté  cheese  was  ripened  about  5.5  months  longer 
than Emmental.) 
Let us first assume that CIGC acts as a joint profit-
maximizing  cartel,  subject  to  the  quota  constraint. 




























.         (2) 
The first-order condition is: 
￿ 
P QC ( )+    P  QC ( )QC  
kE
kC
PE, 2  C1 +
kE
kC
C2 = 0,  (3) 
where 
￿ 
Ci  denotes  the  first  derivative  of 
￿ 
C  with 
respect to its ith argument. This optimization condition 
can be rewritten: 
￿ 
MR QC ( ) =
kE
kC
PE, 2 +   QC ( ),              (3’) 
where 
￿ 
MR . () denotes the marginal revenue function 
and  




   
 
   
 
   
 








   
 
   
 
   
 
   
.      (4) 
Let us now prove that 
￿ 
  is a nondecreasing function 
of 
￿ 
QC. We have: 










   
 




















   
 














,      (5) 
where the inequality follows from the convexity of 
￿ 
C. 
The  natural  generalization  of  equation  (3’)  to  the 
NEIO  market-level  equilibrium  described  in  (1)  is 
thus: 
￿ 
PMR QC ( ) =
kE
kC
PE, 2 +   QC ( ),              (6) 
with 
￿ 









denoting the perceived marginal revenue curve and 
￿ 
  
the conduct or market power intensity. The coefficient 
￿ 
kE kC  on the lagged price of Emmental reflects the 
difference  in  milk  content  between  the  two  cheese 
varieties. 
The idea behind the cost specification on the RHS 
of equation (6) is that by producing one unit of Comté 
cheese, the industry forfeits the rent that it would earn 
if  it  produced  and  sold  the  quantity  of  Emmental 
cheese corresponding to the amount of EU dairy quota 
utilised to produce this unit. Therefore, in equilibrium, 
the  industry  equates  the  perceived  marginal  revenue 
from producing an additional unit of Comté cheese to 
the  marginal  opportunity  cost  of  doing  so,  which  is 
equal to the marginal revenue forfeited from potential 
sales  of  Emmental  cheese  minus  the  difference  in 
marginal  costs 
￿ 
  QC ( ).  This  opportunity  cost 
specification  assumes  that  the  milk  content  of  both 
cheese varieties is fixed and does not depend on the 
quantities  produced,  an  assumption  parallel  to  the 
traditional fixed-proportions hypothesis ubiquitous in 
the NEIO literature. Given that more milk is used to 
produce 1 kg of Emmental than 1 kg of Comté, the 
coefficient 
￿ 
kE kC  should be close to but less than 1. 
More precisely, the productivity of milk in Comté is 
about 10% (i.e., 10 kg of Comté can be made from 
100  kg  of  milk),  while  that  of  Emmental  ranges 
between  8  and  9%.  Thus, 
￿ 
kE kC   is  expected  to  be 
between 0.8 and 0.9.  
 V. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
The  demand  for  Comté  cheese  is  specified  as 
follows: 
￿ 
lnqC = 0 + Sp + Su + Fa +  C lnP C
+  Sp lnP CSp+  SulnP CSu+  Fa lnP CFa
+  E lnPE +  E lnP C lnPE
+  I lnI +  I lnP CI + ed
,  (7) 
where 
￿ 
qC  denotes  the  per  capita  quantity  of  Comté 




Su  and 
￿ 
Fa  are  seasonal  dummy 
variables, 
￿ 
P C and 
￿ 
PE represent the wholesale prices of 
Comté and Emmental, respectively, and 
￿ 
I denotes the 
per capita net disposable income. Prices and income 
are deflated using the general CPI.  
This  demand  specification  has  the  desirable 
property of allowing each of the three shifters (price of 
Emmental,  income  and  season)  to  increase  demand 
proportionately and rotate the demand elasticity. This 
flexibility  is  necessary  to  avoid  spurious  effects  of 
those shifters on the demand elasticity estimates. 
To  assess  the  importance  of  functional  form 
assumptions, we estimate an alternate model based on 
a linear version of equation (6): 
￿ 
qC = 0 + Sp + Su + Fa +  CP C
+  SpP CSp+  SuP CSu+  FaP CFa
+  EPE +  EP CPE
+  II +  IP CI + ed
.      (7’) 
The  supply  relationship  is  derived  from  the 
theoretical model exposed in section IV. In addition, 
we assume that the cost difference 
￿ 
  QC ( ) is an affine 
function  of 
￿ 
QC,  the  total  quantity  of  Comté.  The 










  = c0 + c1PE, 2 + c2QC + es,      (8) 
where the demand elasticity 
￿ 
 CC is a function of the 
demand parameters 
￿ 

















c2 are cost parameters to be estimated. 
Note that because 
￿ 
P C and 
￿ 
PE, 2 are both divided by 
the price index, our specification implicitly assumes 
that the cost difference between Comté and Emmental, 
keeping 
￿ 
QC constant, has risen proportionately to the 
price index. The presence of the term 
￿ 
c2QC allows us 
to  test  for  scale  in  the  conversion  from  Emmental 
production to Comté production. In particular, if farms 
are  heterogeneous  in  their  ability  to  shift  from 
Emmental to Comté production, we would expect the 
coefficient 
￿ 
c2 to be positive. As argued in section IV, 
the coefficient 
￿ 
c1 should reflect the difference in milk 
content between Comté and Emmental and is expected 
to range between 0.8 and 0.9. 
 
VI. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The  data  covers  the  period  from  January  1985  to 
December 2005. The starting date was chosen as 1985 
because the EU dairy quota program, assumed to have 
influenced the supply of milk, was introduced in 1984. 
Industry  data  on  the  wholesale  price  and  marketed 
quantity of Comté cheese comes from CIGC. It is not 
possible to distinguish between domestic and  export 
sales. However, given the very small share of exports 
(about  5%),  total  quantity  should  constitute  a 
reasonable proxy.  
Industry data on the wholesale price of Emmental 
cheese comes from SIGF (Syndicat interprofessionnel 
du gruyère français). For both Comté and Emmental, 
some adjustments to the raw data were necessary to 
account for changes in the way the industry price was 
calculated  over  the  period  of  investigation.  Detailed 
information  regarding  these  adjustments  is  available 
upon request. 
The net disposable national income for France was 
obtained  from  Eurostat,  and  so  was  the  population 
variable used to construct the per capita Comté cheese 
consumption and net disposable income variables. 
A  general  CPI  for  France  was  obtained  from  the 
OECD database. 
Summary  statistics  are  reported  in  table  1.  Prices 
and income are in constant 2000 euros. 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics 
 
Variable  All   Winter  Spring  Summer  Fall 
Total quantity  9.08  8.75  8.56  9.08  9.93 
(1000 tons)  (1.49)  (1.36)  (1.36)  (1.37)  (1.59) 
Per capita qty  1.52  1.47  1.43  1.52  1.66 
(100 g/inh.)  (0.212)  (0.188)  (0.187)  (0.187)  (0.221) 
Comté price  5.58  5.59  5.59  5.56  5.57 
(€/kg)  (0.378)  (0.417)  (0.403)  (0.360)  (0.356) 
Emmental price  4.99  5.03  4.99  4.96  4.96 
(€/kg)  (0.367)  (0.409)  (0.364)  (0.340)  (0.375) 
Income  4.60  4.57  4.58  4.61  4.64 
(1000 €/inh.)  (0.563)  (0.574)  (0.575)  (0.576)  (0.565) 
Observations  84  21  21  21  21 
 VII. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 
The  simultaneous  equations  system  consisting  of 
the demand and pricing equations is estimated using 
the iterated non linear optimal generalized method of 
moments.  The  weighting  matrix  is  constructed 
allowing for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up 





are uncorrelated. Instruments for equations (7) or (7’), 
denoted by the row vector 
￿ 
Zd , include a constant, the 
logarithms  of 
￿ 
PE  and 
￿ 
I,  seasonal  dummies,  and  a 
series of interaction terms constructed from 
￿ 
PE, 2 to 
instrument  for  each  of  the  endogenous  regressors 
involving the price of Comté. Instruments for equation 
(8), denoted by the row vector 
￿ 
Zs, include a constant, 
￿ 
PE, 2,  the  logarithms  of 
￿ 
PE  and 
￿ 
I,  and  seasonal 
dummies.  




   
 




   
 
    .  The 
moment conditions used for estimation are: 
￿ 
E e |Z ( ) = 0.                         (9) 
The  vector  of  unknown  model  parameters  is 
denoted    , and the sample size is denoted 
￿ 
T. Using 
tildes to denote the sample equivalents of each random 
variable,  the  estimates 
￿ 
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 1 %  Z % e ,                     (10) 
where matrix 
￿ 
˜  S  was estimated recursively as the HAC 
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The results from estimating parameters 
￿ 
ˆ     using the 
double-log  and  linear  demand  specifications  are 
displayed  in  table  2.  Reported  standard  errors  are 
heteroskedasticity-robust  and  corrected  for 
autocorrelation with 3 lags according to the Newey-
West  procedure  [9].  A  3-lag  specification  is  chosen 
because  the  production  plan  is  adopted  on  a  yearly 
basis,  and  therefore  the  quantity  marketed  in  each 
quarter is likely to be correlated with that marketed in 
the other quarters of the same year. Hansen’s J-test of 
overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the model or 
the  set  of  stochastic  assumptions  used  for 
identification.  In  particular,  the  exogeneity  of  the 
contemporaneous  and  lagged  prices  of  Emmental  to 
demand and the supply relation cannot be empirically 
rejected. 
A. Demand estimates 
 
Demand  estimates  seem  acceptable  and  robust  to 
the choice of functional form for the demand equation. 
The  implied  own-price,  cross-price  and  wealth 
elasticity  averages  over  the  period  all  have  the 
expected  sign  and  reasonable  magnitudes.  However, 
the  magnitude  of  the  wealth-elasticity  of  demand  is 
not  consistent  with  the  general  belief  that  Comté 
cheese is a luxury good. This may be attributable to 
the parsimony of the demand specification and the use 
of  total  income  rather  than  expenditure  on  a  more 
narrowly defined group. The temporal variation in the 
own-price elasticity of demand is depicted in figure 1, 
and is consistent between the two tested models. Own-
price elasticity averages over the period are -1.252 for 
the double-log model and -1.148 for the linear model, 
which  seems  reasonable  given  available  elasticity 
estimates for the  entire cheese group in France. For 
instance, we found an estimate of -0.83 (INRA 1998) 
and an estimate of -0.70 (CNIEL 2005). 
All three demand shifters are significant based on 
the  F-tests  reported  in  the  second  part  of  table  2. 
Therefore, seasonality, the price of Emmental and the 
income variable all seem to affect demand. While the 
separate  effects  of  the  Emmental  price  and  income 
shifters on the intercept and the slope of demand are 
statistically significant, this is not always the case for 
the  seasonality  shifters  taken  individually.  However, 
when tested for their joint effect on the intercept and 
the slope, all three seasonal effects taken individually 
are highly significant, particularly the Fall effect (note 
the singularly high F-statistic). Furthermore, the signs 
of the seasonal effects are consistent across the two 
tested models. In particular, demand intercepts seem to 
be  larger,  and  demand  slopes  steeper,  during  the 
Spring,  Summer  and  Fall  quarters,  compared  to  the 
baseline  Winter  quarter.  More  interestingly,  we 
confirm  statistically  that  demand  for  Comté  cheese 
reaches a peak during the Fall season, a trend that is 
well understood by industry representatives and can be 
attributed  to  increased  consumption  during  the 
Christmas  holiday  period.  This  conclusion  can  be 
drawn by conducting pairwise tests that compare, for 
any two seasons, the combined effects of the slope and 
intercept seasonal dummies on demand, the price of 
Comté being set at its sample mean. For instance, to 
see  whether  demand  was  significantly  higher  in  the 
Fall  than  in  the  Summer,  other  factors  being  held 
constant,  we  tested  the  hypothesis: 
￿ 
H0 :  Fa +  Fa lnP C    Su +  SulnP C [ ] = 0  against ￿ 
H1 :  Fa +  Fa lnP C    Su +  SulnP C [ ] > 0  and 
were  able  to  reject  the  null  at  the  5%  level  of 
significance. We conducted similar pairwise tests for 
other  seasons  and  determined  that  demand  was 
significantly  higher  in  the  Fall  than  in  any  other 
season. 
 
Table 2 Results from the NLOGMM estimation 
 
The  asterisk  denotes  statistical  significance  at  the  5%  level.  The 
reported  F-statistics  relate  to  the  joint  significance  of  regressors  that 
include the shifter of interest. The reported J-test is for Hansen’s test of 
overidentifying restrictions [8]. The last part of the table reports sample 
averages of the implied own-price, cross-price and wealth elasticities of 
demand. 
 
Parameters λ  Double log model  Linear model 
βC   19.161*  2.698* 
  (5.203)  (0.774) 
βSp   -0.163*  -0.032 
  (0.075)  (0.021) 
βSu   -0.245  -0.069* 
  (0.128)  (0.033) 
βFa   -0.106  -0.076 
  (0.174)  (0.044) 
βE   -5.060*  -0.188* 
  (1.432)  (0.059) 
βI   -8.011*  -0.447* 
  (2.156)  (0.126) 
α0   -28.904*  -14.599* 
  (8.996)  (4.345) 
αSp   0.252  0.142 
  (0.129)  (0.118) 
αSu  0.448*  0.430* 
  (0.223)  (0.187) 
αFa   0.304  0.615* 
  (0.298)  (0.245) 
γE   8.808*  1.084* 
  (2.549)  (0.353) 
γI   14.259*  2.663* 
  (3.639)  (0.680) 
c0  0.261  0.031 
  (1.122)  (0.911) 
c1  0.915*  0.962* 
  (0.167)  (0.138) 
c2  0.070  0.071 
  (0.053)  (0.041) 
θ  0.007  0.007 
  (0.009)  (0.012) 
Spring F(2,152)  9.988*  7.612* 
Summer F(2,152)  6.339*  6.824* 
Fall F(2,152)  54.294*  56.032* 
Emmental F(2,152)  7.268*  5.385* 
Income F(2,152)  66.589*  80.674* 
J-test χ
2(3)  0.896  1.430 
ηCC  -1.252  -1.148 
ηCE  0.121  0.083 




Fig. 1 Demand elasticities derived from the double-log 
(elaslog) and linear (elaslin) models 
 
B. Cost and conduct estimates 
 
Both cost and conduct estimates seem satisfactory 
in terms of their magnitude and statistical significance. 
The sensitivity of the cost and conduct parameters to 
the demand specification is very acceptable. 
The  coefficient  on  the  lagged  price  of  Emmental 
cheese, 
￿ 
c1, is highly significant and is slightly smaller 
than  1  under  the  alternative  demand  specifications 
(estimates  are  0.915  for  the  double-log  model  and 
0.962  for  the  linear  model).  The  point  estimate  is 
slightly higher than anticipated. However, the value of 
0.8,  which  constituted  a  lower  bound  in  our  initial 
expectation, lies within the 95% confidence interval. 
The estimate of 
￿ 
c2 is small and insignificant. Thus, 
we fail to reject the hypothesis of constant returns to 
scale in the conversion from Emmental to Comté. In 
terms of the  function 
￿ 
 , this means that  we cannot 




= 0,  at least locally. 
Given that the milk processing and ripening stages for 
the  two  cheeses  are  more  likely  to involve  constant 
returns to scale than farm operations, this result may 
be an indication of a certain farm homogeneity among 
those producers who have shifted from Emmental to 
Comté  over  the  period  of  investigation.  Said 
differently,  the  result  could  mean  that  farm 
heterogeneity  is  not  sufficient,  around  the  observed 
equilibrium,  to  link  the  observed  increase  in  the 
quantity of Comté cheese to higher production costs.  
Finally, and most importantly given the purpose of 
this study, the market power estimate 
￿ 
ˆ     is positive, small  and  statistically  insignificant  in  both  models. 
Monopoly is easily rejected, based on the test (
￿ 
  =1 
vs. 
￿ 
  <1), at the 5% level of significance. Extremely 
weak forms of symmetric Cournot oligopoly are also 
rejected. For instance, we reject a 25-firm symmetric 
Cournot  oligopoly  at  the  5%  level  of  significance. 
Market  power  estimates  are  well  within  values 
traditionally considered to be close enough to perfect 
competition not to raise economic efficiency concerns 
[10]. 
In  an  unreported  regression,  we  estimated  a 
modified model, allowing the market power intensity 
to  take  different  values  on  the  two  sub-periods 
1985q1-1995q3  and  1995q4-2005q4.  The  choice  of 
sub-periods  was  motivated  by  the  observation  that 
production  caps  up  to  the  1994-1995  campaign  had 
little effect in practice.  First,  Comté production was 
not attractive in the late 1980s, so that entry into the 
industry did not have to be prevented. Second, even 
though  the  attractiveness  of  the  Comté  sector 
increased in the early 1990s, the over-quota penalty 
was too small to discourage  entry.  The penalty  was 
increased for the 1995-1996 campaign and remained at 
high  levels  afterwards.  Given  the  ripening  time  of 
Comté  cheese,  if  binding  caps  took  hold  in  March 
1995,  the  effect  should  be  detectible  starting  two 
periods  later.  The  results  from  estimating  this 
modified  model  did  not  support  the  hypothesis  that 
market  power  had  been  more  “intense”  towards  the 
end  of  the  study  period,  and  did  not  alter  the 
conclusions of no evident market power in the Comté 
market.  The  conduct  parameter  was  small  and 
insignificant for the first period, and small, negative 
and insignificant for the second period. In addition, the 
hypothesis that the two conduct parameters are equal 





In  this  article,  an  NEIO  technique  was  used  to 
measure  the  degree  of  seller  market  power  in  the 
French  Comté  cheese  industry,  characterised  by 
vertical contracts between milk producers and ripening 
facilities and a government-sanctioned supply control 
scheme  that  has  drawn  particular  attention  from 
French  antitrust  authorities.  Identification  of  the 
market power parameter was enabled by the inclusion 
of  three  different  demand  shifters  in  the  demand 
specification,  all  allowed  to  change  the  demand 
elasticity. One originality of the model lies within the 
cost  specification,  which  includes  the  price  of 
Emmental  cheese,  to  take  account  of  the  European 
dairy quota policy and the substitutability of the two 
cheeses  in  production.  Since  the  dairy  quota  policy 
likely creates a wedge between the marginal cost of 
milk  and  its  market  price,  defining  the  opportunity 
cost of Comté production in terms of the net revenue 
forgone from potential sales of Emmental, rather than 
a sum of input expenses, is critical to avoid attributing 
any  significant  price-cost  margin  solely  to  market 
power exercised at the level of the Comté industry. 
The hypothesis of perfect competition could not be 
rejected. In contrast, monopoly was rejected, and so 
were  extremely  weak  forms  of  Cournot  oligopoly. 
Cost and market power estimates were robust to the 
demand specification.  
This study sheds serious doubts on the ability of the 
observed supply control scheme to allow the Comté 
cheese  industry  to  exert  significant  market  power 
towards  buyers.  Small  values  of  the  market  power 
parameter  imply  that  the  associated  deadweight  loss 
has been negligible over the period. This conclusion 
contrasts  with  the  ruling  of  the  French  antitrust 
authority and provides some reassurance regarding the 
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